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PREFACE 
This Working Paper initiates a series on research in 
progress in the field of human adjustments to natural 
hazards. It is intended that these papers will be used as 
working documents by the group of scholars directly 
involved in hazard research as well as inform a larger 
circle of interested persons. The series is now being 
supported from funds granted by the u.s. National Science 
Foundation to the University of Chicago and Clark 
University. Authorship of papers is not necessarily 
confined to those working at these institutions. 
Further information about the research program is 
available from the following: 
Gilbert F. White, 
Department of Geography, 
University of Chicago, 
Chicago, Illinois 60637, 
U. S. A. 
Robert W. Kates, 
Graduate School of Geography, 
Clark University, 
Worcester, Massachusetts 01610, 
U. S. A. 
Ian Eurton, 
Department of Geography, 
University of Toronto, 
Toronto 5, Ontario, 
Canada. 
Requests for copies of these papers and correspondence 
relating directly thereto should be addressed to Toronto. 
THE HUMAN ECOLOGY OF EXTREME GEOPHYSICAL EVENTS 
A paradox is presented in man's apparently growing 
susceptibility to injury from natural hazards during a 
period of enlarged capacity to manipulate nature. In many 
countries flood control dams are repaying the capital 
invested in their construction by preventing flood losses 
that would otherwise have occurred; arid and semi-arid lands 
are being made agriculturally productive by the provision of 
irrigation water from canals and tube wells; snow removal 
operations are increasingly effective and weather forecasting 
has improved in reliability and length of range. Nature 
retreats on every hand and man, armed with a burgeoning 
technology, is asserting his ecological dominance yet more 
surely. 
Nevertheless, in every month the mass media report in 
dr~aatic fashion the occurrence of natural disasters in 
North America and around the world. Within the recent past 
a cyclone in East Pakistan, an earthquake in Turkey, and a 
drought in southern Africa have demonstrated the perils 
to which man is heir. In fall 1966 floods in Florence were 
responsible for much human suffering and for damage to 
paintings, SCUlpture and books that constitute part of the 
priceless heritage of western civilization. 
An estimate of total losses from selected geophysical 
hazards in the United States is given in Table 1. These are 
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Table 1 
Estimates of average annual losses from selected geophysical 
hazards in the United States. Single year estimates are the 
level of average losses current to year cited. Property 
damage figures are in millions of dollars unadjusted unless 
otherwise noted. 
HAZARD Loss of Life Property Damage No. Period Source Amount Period Source 
Floods 70 1955-64 (1 ) 1000 1966 (2 ) 
350-1000 1964 (3 ) 
290 1955-64 (1) 
Hurricanes 110 1915-64 (1 ) 250-500* 1966 (4 ) 
100 1964 (3 ) 
89 1915-64 (1) 
Tornadoes 194 1916-64 (1) 100-200* 1966 (4) 
40 1944-64 (1) 
Hail, wind and 300 1967 ( 5) 
Thunderstorms 125-250* 1966 (4) 
53 1944-53 (6 ) 
Lightening 
Strikes and 160 1953-63 (1) 100 1965 (1) 
Fire 
Earthquakes 3 1945-64 (1, 7) 15 1945-64 (1, 8) 
Tsunamis 18 1945-64 (1, 8) 9 1945-64 (1, 9) 
Heat and 
Isolation 238 1955-64 (10) 
Cold 313 1955-64 (10 ) 
TOTALS 1106 621-2174 
* Insured losses only 
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the hazard extremes which cause marked human suffering and 
social dislocation. Annual average damage from all extreme 
geophysical events LS probably between two and three billion 
dollars a year (11). Social costs seem to be mounting 
rather than declining. 
To understand this paradox it is necessary to examine 
Ln ecological perspective the impacts of natural hazards upon 
human society and the range of response to them. Persistent 
settlement and use of areas subject to recurrent natural 
hazards has long excited the curiosity of geographers who 
have noted that men return to rebuild their devastated 
settlements in flood plains, on the slopes of volcanoes and 
in zones of high earthquake activity, and who have recorded 
the surging waves of success and failure in areas of scanty, 
uncertain rainfall (12). Awareness of the risk of repeated 
disasters probably is hLgher in modern man, but the pattern 
of reinvasion of hazard areas is no less than in the past, 
and is very probably stronger. 
While the research reported here has revealed many new 
questions, it also has some slgnificant implications. The 
most serious of these is that mankind appears to be little 
nearer the conquest of nature in its more violent and extreme 
fluctuations. Rather, the magnitude of the impact of rare 
natural events upon society is increasing in terms of real 
property damage and loss of life, although there is verbal 
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reluctance to accept these costs. This phenomenon may be 
explained in simple terms by the continuing spread of man and 
his works over greater areas of the earth's surface and his 
presence in more places in greater numbers than before. In 
addition to the "real" increase in the impact of natural 
hazards, the "apparent" increase is due to improved 
communications which spread the news of the latest disaster 
to more people more rapidly, and to an increasing expression 
of intolerance for the vagaries of nature in an age of 
powerful technology. Natural hazar.ds become ·greater problems 
in the minds of men as affluence spreads and as recognition 
grows of a social resp6nsibility to cushion all members of a 
society against unexpected hazards. 
In a distinctive way the question of man's capacity to 
shape a livelihood free from disruption by environmental 
extremes draws together analysis of both physical and social 
processes. Over the past decade two distinct lines of 
research have evolved, One approach is exemplified by the 
NAS-NRC disaster research group (13, 14, 15, 16) and the work 
of the Disaster Research Center at Ohio State University (17). 
This work, mainly by behavioral scientists, apparently 
developed in the search for analogs with nuclear disaster and 
has been primarily concerned with human behavior during the 
emergency period and under great stress. This characteristic 
distinguishes it from the second approach, illustrated by the 
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research reported here, which has been concerned with the 
long run persistence of settlement in hazard areas and with 
associated attempts to regulate the hazards. 
Recent investlgations of floods, drought and earthquake 
suggest that much technological manipulation of environment 
produces new hazards while ameliorating old ones, and that 
effective design of social measures for coping with extreme 
events calls for a sensitive understanding of natural 
phenomena as altered by complex social relationships. Such a 
stance is consistent with one strain of geographic research 
as outlined by Harlan H. Barrows who saw geography as human 
ecology or the study of the adjustment of man to his 
environment (18). From that viewpoint man interferes with 
the complex systems of air, water, soil and life that surround 
him, and seeks to isolate himself from many aspects of the 
natural world, to reconstruct others, and to adjust in varied 
ways to the rhythms and discontinuities of the resulting 
environment. In studying these interactions, it may be 
helpful to combine an anthropocentric notion of ecological 
human dominance with a normative concern for understanding 
the implications of human actions and taking responsibility 
for them. This normative concern is tempered by the 
hypothesis that man, while capable of powerful actions, 
possesses severe and shifting limits on both his ability to 
perceive and understand the world around him and to choose 
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among appropriate courses of action (19). These limitations, 
arising from nature, personality, society and culture, 
provide the bounds within which rational action may take 
place. 
The broad setting of the study of man-environment 
relationships, the philosophical stance of the bounded 
rationality of man, and the methodology of behavioral science 
make it possible to approach the long term human adjustment 
to natural hazard along five lines. Minimal understanding 
of conditions upon which social policy might be based would 
involve research helping to 1) assess the extent of human 
occupance by hazard zones, 2) identify the full range of 
possible human adjustments to the hazard, 3) study how man 
perceives and estimates the occurrence of hazard, 4) describe 
the process of adoption of damage-reducing adjustments in 
their social context, and 5) estimate the optimal set of 
adjustments in terms of anticipated social consequences. 
To seek these goals we have sought to identify an 
inhabitant's view of the hazard. The attitudes of flood-plain 
residents have been a primary concern and about 2,000 in-depth 
interviews with residents of riverine and tidal flood plains 
have been collected (see Table 2). There has been a wide 
. 
adoption of behavioral science techniques, not new in 
themselves, but not hitherto employed extensively in 
geographical research. These include the use of both 
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Table 2 
Personal Interviews with Natural Hazard Zone Occupants 
Type of Hazard Date No. Principal 
Investigator(s) 
Flood 1960 103 
1960 71 
Roder (20)1 
Burton (20) 
Coastal Storms 
Drought 
1960 150 Burton (21) 
1961 178 Kates-White 
(22, 23) 
1963 20 Burton (24) 
1963 38 Kates (25) 
1963 70 Sewell (26) 
1966 1022 Czamanske (27) 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1965 
1966 
361 
100 
70 
249 
20 
Burton, Kates 
Mather, Snead 
(28) 
Saarinen (29) 
2 Kates-Arey 
Rooney (30) 
Burton 3 
Location 
Topeka, Kansas 
Hammond, Munster, 
Ind. 
Rural areas in 12 
states 
Tenn., Calif., I 
Wise., N.Y., 
Ohio 
Belleville, 
Ontario 
Con,necticut 
Fraser Valley, 
B.C., Canada 
Ga., Ill., Pa., 
La., N. J . , 
~...;r • Va., N. Car. 
East Coast of U.S., 
Maine to N.C. 
Great Plains 
Massachusetts 
Wy., S. Dak., Ill. 
Ontario snow belt, 
Canada 
Tsunami 1966 211 Havighurst (41) Oahu, Hawaii 
1 Figures in parentheses refer to published ac~ounts 
in references. 
2 In process. 
3 Unpublished source. 
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structured and unstructured interviews (20), thematic 
aperception tests (29), content analysis of news media (30), 
models of decision-making (31,22), benefit-cost analysis 
(23, 24), and new and extended uses of probability theory 
(23). New uses have been made of traditional geographical 
methods: land-use mapping, and air-photo techniques (32, 
21,28). 
Extent of Human Occupance 
Estimates of several kinds have been made primarily with 
respect to the United States. There are approximately 2,000 
cities ln flood plains in the United States (32) and 200 
communities with populations over 1,000 similarly located in 
Canada (33, 26). At least five per cent of the area of the 
United States is subject to flood (2" p. 12). There are about 
125,000 structures on the outer shore between Maine and North 
Carolina less than ten feet above mean sea level (28). A 
quantity of real property approximately equivalent to the 
housing stock of Boston is situated in this highly exposed 
and vulnerable position. 
Beyond these estimates little is known. We are aware 
of only one effort to assess the joint probability of several 
hazards at one place (34). While many more such estimates of 
occupance could be made (e.g., of areas subject to a specified 
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level of risk from hail, tornadoes, tsunamis, etc.), problems 
of definition and doubt as to their value in relation to the 
amount of effort required to make the estimate appear likely 
to inhibit large-scale efforts in this direction. For 
example, a flood is sometimes said to begin when a river 
overflows its banks or when rainwater ponds up in poorly 
drained areas. By another criteria, no flood occurs until 
damage begins. The delimitation of drought areas well 
illustrates the illusive character of hazard as defined in 
human terms. A designation of a drought area by the Russell 
formula (35) or by-the more recent Palmer index (36) assumes 
that a certain duration and intensity of mOlsture deficiency 
will be injurious to agriculture. A change in the genetic 
characteristics of cultivated plants or in methods of curbing 
losses in soil moisture would necessarily alter the critical 
limit. 
Every definition of hazard requires assumptions as to 
human aims and modes of adjustment. Selection of critical 
physical parameters of flood flows or drought duration is 
influenced by and, in turn, influences judgement as to what 
types of adjustment will be desirable. 
Further work in the del~mitation of hazard areas and 
measuring the extent of occupance would nevertheless be of 
value as an aid in understanding the magnitude of the hazard. 
Just how useful it can be in reducing losses is subject to 
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question and the answer depends upon perception and choice 
criteria to be noted • The authors" like many others, 
believe that in favorable conditions, by informing and 
educating the public, it is possible to help in the 
development of improved public policies. Efforts in these 
directions with respect to floods are being made by the 
Tennessee Valley Authority which has published flood hazard 
reports for more than 115 communities since 1950; the u.s. 
Geological Survey which has issued flood hazard maps in its 
hydrologi~ atlas since 1959; and the Army Corps of Engineers 
which now is embarked upon a national flood plain information 
'program. As an interim measure the Corps is compiling for 
other Federal agencies a list of all towns having a 
significant flood hazard. In Ontario, flood hazard estimates. 
have been made for a number of communities by the Conservation 
Authorities Branch (37). 
Beyond problems of definition the question of trends in 
hazard-zone occupance by degrees of hazard is of special 
significance. On the outer shores of megalopolis in the 
period 1940-60 a greater relative increase of structures has 
occurred below mean high water than in the area above that 
level (28). An increase in the proportion of flood damage of 
a catastrophic nature has also been noted and reflects 
increased occupance of the more hazardous flood plains as 
well as the failure of engineering structures to contain 
extremely large di~charges (38). Relative changes in 
occupance of hazard zones is in part a function of the 
pattern and range of human adjustment. 
Range of Human Adjustment 
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To any given natural hazard there is a wide range of 
theoretically possible adjustments. The theoretical range 
of adjustments to flood, snow and earthquake is given in 
Table 3. A much more simple graphic device in common use for 
public information purposes by the Tennessee Valley Authority 
is reproduced as Figure 1. It might be thought obvious that 
this full range would be recognized by intelligent occupants 
of a hazard area as well as by professional observers, but 
that rarely happens. We find few instances in which all the 
theoretical possibilities are canvassed. 
In examining these adjustments it is useful to make a 
distinction between those which seek to rearrange or 
manipulate nature and those which involve a rearrangement or 
alteration of human behavior. The former may be equated 
with the technological approach to hazard problems, the 
latter with the social or behavioral approach. The 
technological approach emphasizes the construction of dams 
and levees to control floods; sinking of new and deeper wells 
in periods of drought; cloud seeding to increase rainfall in 
p. 12' 
Table 3 
Theoretical Range of Adjustments to Geophysical Events 
Class of 
Adjustment 
Affect the 
cause 
Modify the 
hazard 
Modify 
loss 
potential 
Adjust to 
losses: 
Spread the 
losses 
Plan for 
losses 
Bear the 
losses 
E 
Earthquakes 
No known way of 
altering the 
earthquake 
mechanism 
Stable site 
selection: soil 
and slope 
stabilization; 
sea wave 
barriers; fire 
protection 
Warning 
systems; 
emergency 
evacuation and 
preparation; 
building 
design; land-
use change; 
permanent 
evacuation 
Public relief; 
subsidized 
insurance 
Insurance and 
reserve funds 
Individual 
loss bearing 
V E N T 
Floods 
Reduce flood 
flows by: 
land-use 
treatment; 
cloud seeding 
Control flood 
flows by: 
reservoir 
storage; levees; 
channel 
improvement; 
flood fighting 
Warning 
systems; 
emergency 
evacuation and 
preparation; 
building 
design; land-
use change; 
permanent 
evacuation 
Public relief; 
subsidized 
insurance 
Insurance and 
reserve funds 
Individual 
loss bearing 
Snow 
Change 
geographical 
distribution 
by cloud 
seeding 
Reduce impact 
by snow fences; 
snow removal; 
salting and 
sanding of 
highways 
Forecasting; 
rescheduling; 
inventory 
control; 
building 
design; 
seasonal 
adjustments 
(snow tires, 
chains) ; 
seasonal 
migration; 
designation of 
snow emergency 
routes 
Public relief; 
subsidized 
insurance 
Insurance and 
reserve funds 
Individual 
loss bearing 
/FLOOD 
DAMAGE PREVENTION I 
I 
I CORRECTIVE 
MEASURES I 
l PREVENTIVE 
MEASURES J 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
FLOOD 
CO NTI{)L 
I 
I OTHER 
CORRECT I VE 
MEASURES I 
I FLOOD 
PLAIN 
REGULATIONS I 
I OTHER 
PREVENfi VE 
M
EASURES I 
I 
DAM
S 
a. 
RESERVOIRS 
I-
~
 
EVACUATION 
I 
I 
ZONING 
ORDINANCES 
I-
-
-
-t 
DEVELOPM
ENT 
PO
ll CIES 
~
 
OPEN 
SPACES 
I 
LEVEES 
OR 
W
ALLS 
f-
~
 
FLOOD 
FORECASTING 
J 
I SUBDIVISION 
REGULATIONS f-
H
 
TAX 
A
D
JU5TM
E'HS 
I 
CHANNEL 
IM
PROVEM
ENTS 
I-
-~ 
FLOOD 
PROOFI NG 
I 
I 
BUILDING 
CODES 
r-
-
-l 
WA~NIN'. 
S'\JN
S 
I 
W
ATERSHED 
TREATM
ENT 1-
~
 
URBAN 
REDEVELOPM
ENT 
J 
I 
HEAL TH R~GULATIONS 
}---
H
 
FLOOD 
INSURANCE 
I 
OTHERS 
J-
I 
1-1 
OTHERS 
I 
I 
l 
OTHERS 
r-
I I 
H
 
OTHERS 
I I I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
L 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
.
.l 
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
_
 
-{" 
BLiC 
ItJFORM
ATION 
AlJD 
EDU':ArJON ~--------l.---------.J 
TE
N
N
E
S
S
E
E
 
V
A
L
L
E
y 
A
U
T
H
O
R
IT
Y
 
1912 
F
igure 1. 
D
iagram
 
o
f 
altern
ativ
e 
m
e
a
s
u
re
s
 
fo
r p
rev
en
tin
g
 
flood 
lo
sses. 
T
his 
w
a
s 
p
rep
ared by 
the 
L
ocal 
F
lood 
R
elatio
n
s D
iv
isio
n
 
o
f 
th
e T
ennessee V
alley A
u
th
o
rity
 
for 
u
s
e
 
w
ith
 lo
cal 
planning 
ag
en
cies. 
I I I I I I 
sub-humid areas; and the buttressing of potential slide areas 
in earthquake zones. All these actions are directed to 
affecting the cause of the problem or to a modification of 
the hazard itself. 
The social or behavioral approach emphasizes the 
careful planning of flood-plain land use; more cautious use 
of water and/or curtailed water use in times of drought, and 
uS,e of legislative guides to encourage better building design 
for earthquake resistant structures (39). The prevailing 
public approach has been to offer immediate relief and then 
to turn to the technological approach. Darns follow floods, 
irrigation projects follow droughts. 
The dichotomy between technological and social adjustments 
is useful, but can also be misleading. It is not intended to 
imply that technological adjustments are not required, but 
that they should be used cautiously and in conjunct~on with a 
knowledge of their likely effects. This knowledge can then 
be used to call into play the appropriate social adjustments 
as well. The dichotomy is further complicated because it 
coincides, to a large degree, with different allocations of 
costs. Technological solutions are commonly carried out 
largely at public expense. Social adjustments are often left 
to private citizens, or their cost is. borne largely by a few 
people. There is often strong pressure, therefore, for 
technological solutions because they involve a shift of the 
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costs away from vociferously objecting individuals to the 
society at large. The fact that overall costs may thereby 
be increased does not appear to act as a deterrent. An 
obvious conclusion is the need to place the burden of costs 
for technological solutions more desirably on the shoulders 
of those who benefit and/or to find ways of carrying out 
social adjustments partly at public expense through the use 
of subsidies, incentive payments and the like. 
From the standpoint of human ecology, a recent bias 
has been to encourage recognition of the possible social 
and behavioral adjustments and to study the impact of 
technological adjustments on human behavior and society. We 
find that when carried out in isolation without adequate 
reference to social considerations, the technological 
adjustments may lead to an aggravation of the problem rather 
than an amelioration, as when upstream reservoir construction 
encourages increased invasion of a Tennessee valley flood 
plain at Chattanooga. Commonly, the benefits received are 
short run, and involve the elimination of numerous "small" 
losses at the cost of greater long-term losses often of a 
catastrophic nature. 
Control of floods seems to induce more rapid development 
of flood plains, plus a relaxation of emergency preparations. 
Thus a consequence of adopting the technological fix is the' 
relaxation of preparations for other, more extreme, action. 
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This has been observed in both urban and rural areas (21, 32). 
In some agricultural areas on large flood plains, the 
severing of farm units by the construction of levees has 
permitted the cultivation of more valuable crops on 
unprotected land by giving farmers a more secure base for 
their operations on the protected farmland. In providing 
the partial protection of levees for part of a farming 
operation the technological approach also encourages a more 
speculative utilization of more hazardous land. This 
"levee effect" has been observed on the flood plains of the 
Mississippi and Rio Grande Rivers (21, 40). 
Hazard Perception 
One principal reason that public information as to 
hazard has not led to rapid and solid adjustments is that 
there is great difference among individuals in perception 
of hazards. It has been found useful to distinguish between 
professionals (those for whom dealing with one or more 
natural hazards is a professional occupation that commands 
their continued attention) and non-professionals (for whom 
hazards are incidental to their main pursuits). The 
perceptions of the two groups rarely correspond, but this 
is not necessarily because non-professionals are simply 
ignorant or stupid. Professionals often express their ideas 
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in a way which non-professionals find confusing. For 
example, non-professionals often assume that the hydrologist's 
lOO-year flood occurs once every hundred years. While such 
a mistaken view may affect the choices made and the actions 
taken or neglected, it also conforms to a non-professional 
penchant for making events knowable and cyclical. 
We find that non-professionals have a higher degree of 
awareness of hazard than is commonly assumed by professionals 
and that total ignorance is very rare, although the frequency 
and probability of a hazardous event is often distorted from 
the scientific description. This is frequently done by 
making phenomena determinate in the form of an assumed cycle 
of periodicity. On the other hand, while the professional 
view incorporates stochastic probabilities comfortably, the 
estimates of frequency and magnitude are not as good as they 
are often assumed to be by the non-professional. The 
unreliability of professional hazard estimates can reasonably 
be explained by the fact that the events themselves are often 
infrequent and the period of record is short by comparison. 
This results in a lack of adequate knowledge of the underlying 
distribution of extreme events, and no one theory yet 
commands widespread acceptance. In this regard, professionals 
often mislead non-professionals 'in much the same way and for 
the same reasons that medical doctors do in their legitimate 
efforts to preserve a doctor-patient relationship. 
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Professionals are required to make difficult judgements but 
they must maintain their client's confidence if they are to 
continue to be useful. Thus the engineer's client or the 
doctor's patient usually receives a final judgement or 
diagnosis that fails to convey the full range of uncertainty 
that was involved. 
A fundamental difference between the two groups therefore 
appears to be in their tolerance of uncertainty. We have 
categorized common attitudes to the uncertainty of natural 
hazards among non-professionals in Table 4. Readers may see 
parallels to their own attitudes to hazards. Non-professional 
views are shared by all who are involved with hazards in an 
incidental fashion. From this rule, we would by no means 
exclude ourselves. 
Adoption of Adjustments 
A model of decision-making has been developed (31) which 
helps to explain the adoption process. Under this the choice 
made by individuals in the face of hazard is seen as affected 
not only by their perception of the hazard itself, and the 
range of choice open to them, but also by their perception of 
the technology which they command, the eC'onomic efficiency of 
the alternatives, and their linkages with other people. 
Social constraints and incentives can shape the decision. 
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Empirical eVidence from personal interviews suggests 
that adoption of damage-reducing adjustments bears little or 
no relation to age or education. There is a weak relationship 
with previous experience that becomes most evident in areas 
where very heavy damage has been sustained. Adoptions do not 
appear to be related to socio-economic status except where 
the cost is high (28, p. 584, 22, p. 78). There is a strong 
relationship, however, between adoptions and frequency of 
hazard and especially the perceived frequency of hazard. A 
large number of adoptions are made by a high proportion of 
the population where the probabili~y of a hazard occurrence 
is high, and where the perceived frequency is equated with 
positive certainty (i.e., it will happen). There are very 
few adoptions by a small proportion of the population where 
probability of a hazard occurrence is low and where the 
perceived frequency is equated with negative certainty (i.e., 
it will not happen). The most interestlng situation lies 
between these extremes, where the frequency of the hazard is 
intermediate and high variability of perceived frequency is 
observed in the population. Here wide variations are found 
in the adoption of adjustments by people in similar 
circumstances, and wide variations are also to be expected in 
the proportion of population from place to place making any 
particular adjustment. These findings are graphlcally 
presented in Figure 2. The figure is not intended to imply 
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a continuous distribution of responses to changing flood 
frequency. Both in urban areas and on agricultural flood 
plains there appear to be discrete points of frequency at 
which the human response shifts. These occur at recurrence 
intervals of 1-2 years and 4-5 years (21, 22, 25). 
The full range of adjustments seems more likely to be 
considered by non-professionals under conditions of positive 
certainty than otherwise. The dominant approach of many 
professionals, under any level of hazard frequency is to 
exhibit a strong preference for the technological fix. 
This appears to stern from a strong belief on their part in 
the efficacy of technology and a dis~rust of "social 
engineering" or adjustments in social and behavioral 
responses. Technology as exemplified in the flood control 
. 
darn is seen as more dependable than social engineering with 
its plan to evacuate persons and property upon receipt of a 
flood warning, where the unpredictable behavior of many 
people is involved. On the other hand, there is a large 
school of professionals who eschew exclusive reliance upon 
technology and emphasize the subtle human adjustments to an 
unmodified nature. This was the strong theme of successive 
geographic analyses of Great Plains drought ranging from 
Powell's recommendations as to integrated land and water use 
patterns (42), to the Great Plains Drought Committee's 
proposals for readjustment in farm management plans (43). 
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Optimal Adjustment 
Although little research effort of the type reported has 
focussed on the optimizing procedures developed by economists, 
occasional use has been made of such methods and they are 
always present as a criterion of evaluation in theoretical 
terms (23). Rational economizing approaches such as cost-
benefit analysis, program budgeting and systems analysis 
appear to·be most useful where the problems are well defined 
in terms of risk probability and in terms of streams of 
benefits and costs. Such techniques seem less appropriate and 
less useful under the conditions of uncertainty and the 
complex benefit streams commonly associated with rare and 
extreme events. Complacent optimism about the future role of 
these analytical techniques is not warranted in a society 
where uncertainty is of increasing significance. Much 
interest has centered, for example, on the selection of an 
appropriate discount rate for reducing expected future 
benefits to present value. It appears, however, that the 
results in terms of economic an~lysis from adopting the 
range of discount rates now used and proposed is less than 
the consequences of uncertainty in how to interpret the 
hydrologic record (23). 
Had the latent power of the Arno River been fully 
recognized in 1956, would any different set of adjustments 
have been adopted by the citizens of Florence before the 
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great flood hit them ten years later? How would they have 
computed their social costs and gains, given the uncertainty 
of an event that might not come for another 1000 years? 
An abridged schema for human adjustment to flood is 
given in Figure 3. This is designed to show the major 
choices and their outcomes available to a manager of an 
industrial plant in the Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania. The 
schema also illustrates the opportunity for individual and 
collective choice and for social engineering (change land 
use) or for technological adjustments (protection). The 
optimal choice may normally be assumed to involve some 
combination (23, 44). 
When the economically optimal combination of adjustments 
mixes measures that commonly are taken by individuals, as in 
the case of flood proofing, with public measures, such as 
levee construction or land acquisition, it is extremely 
difficult to state it as a practicable alternative. Yet such 
combinations are feasible and they do exist, as on the 
Golden Triangle in Pittsburgh (45). The unified national 
program for flood loss management indicates how a variety of 
national policies (highway planning, urban renewal, 
mortgage financing and the like), might be articulated so as 
to foster intelligent conscious choice at the local level 
(2). This was the first concerted effort by public agencies 
to deal with all aspects of public action bearing on a 
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single hazard. But the means for making the necessary 
comparisons still are clumsy at best. 
" 
On the question of why men persist in hazard areas 
and continue to occupy them at an increasing rate in spite 
of the sure knowledge that disasters will certainly 
follow, the research offers some grounds for a preliminary 
approximation. A not entirely obvious explanation is that 
men often have good reason· to be thereo Hazard areas may 
present economic opportunities superior to those available 
elsewhere, at least from an individual point of view, or 
to a non-professional perceiver. In some cases, people 
located in hazard areas would find it extremely difficult 
to move out without help from some outside sources, or to 
-
do so may require sustaining a loss, the abandoning of an 
investment or a livelihood" Even when the reasons for 
being in a hazard area are not absolutely compelling (as in the 
use of seacoasts for vacation homes and recreational 
amenities), many people do not feel strongly threatened< 
In such cases they may eliminate the hazard from their 
perceptions, or reduce them to some managable and 
comfortable status. 
Even if people have no good reason to be in hazard zones 
and do feel threatened, institutional arrangements in society 
often operate to keep people in the same place and to protect 
existing interests by reinforcing the status quo. Thus, 
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relief payments are commonly given to victims of disaster to 
permit them to rebuild and rehabilitate only on the same 
site. Help is rarely offered to permit or induce people to 
move to a less hazardous location. Even after years of 
experience in widespread relocation projects (dams, 
highways, urban renewal), total evacuation never seems to 
run smoothly and rarely accomplishes its ends. Despite the 
removal of the town of Valdez from_its perilous deltaic 
position (the town waterfront s~ipped into the ocean in the 
March 27, 1964 Alaska earthquake), new barge facilities have 
just been built at the former location. 
Continuing damages may be viewed as a natural rent 
imposed upon mankind f,or the use of the earth. Why then 
should it not be recognized as a continuing charge and 
budgeted for? That would imply spreading the cost over time 
and distributing it among those who decide to take the risk. 
Now, costs are heavily concentrated at moments in time and 
are often imposed on those least able to bear them. One 
possible strategy is the development of an all-hazard 
insurance program that would be an extension of that now 
being developed for floods (46). The paradoxical danger is 
that in spreading the costs, changes in society and human 
behavior may be induced which would have the long-term 
effect of increasing the rent payable to nature. The task 
of spreading the rent over time and over people is therefore 
p. 25 
not a simple one. 
The Limits of Adjustment 
The foregoing findings suggest that the united States 
will continue to bear a heavy burden of the effects of 
natural hazards for the indefinite future and that new 
strategies can be devised to change the character of losses 
and to reduce this burden within definite limits. It is 
clear, for example, that loss of life can be substantially 
reduced. This has been achieved to a large extent in 
North America. It results in part from more effective 
forecasts and warning devices; from a more highly mobile 
population, and from more SUbstantial structures having 
greater resistance to natural forces. If some elements, at 
least, of advanced Western society can be transferred to the 
rest of the world, there are strong grounds for optimism in 
the curbing of future loss of life. 
There appear to be, however, severe limits on the 
reduction of property losses from natural hazards that can 
be achieved. By a policy of the deliberate biassing of 
institutional arrangements to permit flexible responses to 
disasters, including specifically the possibility of 
removal, by applying available and new technology, and by 
. 
formulating and executing plans of action to utilize 
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effectively the full range of adjustments, there are grounds 
for hope that future damages may be reduced by up to 30-50% 
on a national scale over the next few decades and much less, 
in the foreseeable future, on a global scale. Even if this 
could be done, and it will not be a simple task, the 
residual damages of over 50% of potential will probably 
remain. The problem will be with us for a long time. 
Critical Problems 
If this line of research has aided in formulating new 
public policy to deal with flood losses in the united 
States, it might be worth applying to a broader range of 
hazards than hitherto considered. Extension probably would 
be socially profitable into areas outside North America, 
including non-western cultural areas, where different 
patterns might be found and where comparisons with experience 
already noted might be mutually helpful. As this work 
expands, it may be expected to bring social benefits of an 
immediate kind. In the long run it should also contribute 
to the understanding of at least two sets of critical problems. 
1. Natural and other hazards. Research to date has 
concentrated heavily on floods and other geophysical hazards. 
This reflects the disciplinary bias of geographers and in 
hindsight seems justified because the magnitude of energy 
p. 27 
involved in such hazards creates a need for a wider range of 
adjustments and because they are more readily isolated as 
independent variables in a complex web of relationships. It 
is not yet clear to what extent insights gained in the 
study of one part1cular natural hazard can be applied to 
others, including the biological hazards which we have not 
studiedo There is some evidence for a natural hazard 
syndrome 0 Perhaps men do respond to different natural 
hazards in somewhat similar ways and in ways distinct from 
responses to non-natural hazards. How do attitudes and 
decisions vary in relation to natural or non-natural hazards? 
There is, for example, some indication that men develop 
anxiety to a significantly greater extent in dealing with 
non-natural hazards than with the natural ones that we have 
mainly consideredo 
To what extent do verified generalizations about 
geophysical hazards obtain elsewhere? Is the focus of this 
research a separate universe of problems or is it a sub-set 
of all the situations of threat and uncertainty that 
confront mankind? The d1chotomies between nature and 
nurture, natural and artificial, the act of God and the 
negligence of man appear to be very pervasive notions. To 
put the question a~other way, do human beings behave in 
fundamentally the same way towards the uncertain 
possibility of a business failure (artificial hazard), a 
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period of smog (quasi-natural hazard), or a flood (natural 
hazard)? 
This issue raises interesting speculations about the 
design of social responses. A Nationwide Natural Disaster 
Warning System is being established (1), and an all 
natural hazards insurance program is under discussion. To 
what extent can such responses be modelled on systems for 
dealing with non-natural hazards (or vice-versa) or how do 
they require modification to function effectively? 
2. Uncertainty, crisis, and technology. A provocative 
relationship among uncertainty, crisis and technology emerges 
from a study of the human ecology of natural hazards. 
Evidence from a wide compass suggests that variability in 
human behavior relative to natural hazards is a partial 
function of uncertainty. For example, greater variation in 
the rate of adoption of individual adjustments is found in 
those flood and drought situations where the stimulus from 
the environment is more ambiguous. 
Human response to hazards in the public arena has been 
crisis dominated. Crisis generated decisions often appear 
to be .hastily ~ade and may lead to policies which in turn 
create a new crisis. On the other hand, crisis does play 
a positive role in stimulating action that might never be 
taken in inducing society as well as individuals to 
experiment with new ways of doing things. 
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Occupance of hazard zones has been made more feasible and 
more attractive by applications of technology, but the rising 
component of -flood losses occurring in disastrous proportions 
underline the increasing susceptibility of advanced societies 
to catastrophes. The Northeast blackout of 1965 suggests 
that the safety of fail-safe mechanisms will be cause for 
increasing concern in hazard research. More knowledge is 
clearly needed of the complex interplay of crisis, technology, 
and uncertainty and of the consequences of their operation 
upon man in society. 
This is related to the fundamentals of the man/ 
environment relationship. Extreme variations in nature may 
provide a handle by which to grapple with the role of risk 
and uncertainty in the affairs of men. Crucial tests of our 
. 
knowledge of the psychology of perception may be formulated 
in terms of environmental hazards. We share with students 
of international relations a concern about the role and 
significance of crisis. There is wide interest also in the 
impact of scientific and technological advance on nature 
and the consequences for society. None of these issues can 
yet be subjected to satisfactorily controlled investigation 
and none of them can even be adequately defined in operational 
terms. We can only join forces with others working around the 
periphery of these issues and pursue our studies of extreme 
geophysical events in the intuitive belief that this will lead 
to new insights into man and nature and the nature of man. 
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